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THE INTERESTS SERVED B Y
TECHNOLOGICAL REFORM
The Case of Computing
KENNETH L. KRA EMER
University of California, Irvine
WILLIAM H. D UTTON
San Diego State University
This study explores the interests served by technological reform through an empirical
analysis of power shifts stemming from the use of computer technology in American
local governments. Alternative hypotheses concerning the existence and direction
of power shifts are tested with survey and observational data collected in 42 U.S.
cities. The findings indicate that computer-based systems tend to follow and reinforce
the existing pattern of local government power relationships, whether that pattern
be pluralistic or centralized in bureaucrats, technocrats, or politicians. Consequently,
computing tends to support the interests of the status quo versus the interests of
reform.
Administrative reformers have always wanted to make govern-
ment more businesslike by strengthening the professional
management of government agencies (Banfield and Wilson,
1966). At the local level, the early reformers initiated struc-
tural reforms such as master planning, council-manager
government, nonpartisan ballots, and at-large elections.
At the state and national levels, they initiated the merit
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system, the executive budget, and the appointment versus
election of department heads. Structural reform still emerges
in contemporary mechanisms such as regional agencies for
area-wide planning and coordination and mini-city halls
for the decentralization of service delivery. Whereas the
early reformers focused upon structural change as the primary
means of implementing their goals, contemporary reformers
increasingly turn toward technological change. Thus, many
governments have turned to the adoption and use of new
technologies coincident with rapid advancements in the
application of management science, computing, telecommuni-
cations, and other administrative technologies in the private
sector.
This trend is reflected in the widespread diffusion of
computer technology in the government sector.2 Computer
technology might further the business goals of economy
and efficiency through technical payoffs in the processing
of information. Consequently, the success of computer
processing of information might be evaluated as a reform
mechanism by its impacts on saving money, staff, and other
governmental resources. However, the functions of techno-
logical reform may be political as well as technical. Those
who control technological reforms may shape the design and
use of technology to serve their interests over the interests
of others (Dutton and Kraemer, 1977). In doing so, political
goals can supplant the business goals of economy and efficien-
cy. Therefore, if one is to evaluate computer technology as a
reform mechanism, one must first explore the interests served
by the technology.
This paper investigates the interests served by computing
as a technological reform. Specifically, it is about the power
shifts which result from governmental computer use and
the interests served by these power shifts. There are five
hypotheses about the direction of power shifts which are
empirically examined using survey and case study data on
American cities.
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COMPUTERS AND POWER SHIFTS
There is considerable debate in the literature over both
the existence and direction of power shifts and, therefore,
whose interests are served by computing. On the one hand,
some suggest that computing is apolitical in that it does not
result in power shifts (Kling, 1974; Westin, 1972a). Computer-
based information is claimed to be unsophisticated, of low
quality, often conflicting, one of many sources of information,
easily ignored by decision makers, often irrelevant, and, even
if relevant to decisions, leaves great room for interpretation.
In sum, decision makers would seldom develop or change their
position on the basis of computer printouts.
On the other hand, information is viewed as a political
resource within organizations much like status or positional
authority and is closely akin to expertise. Because computers
can change the character of information flows within organiza-
tions-including the speed, direction, content, and pattern
of circulation-computers might influence the relative de-
cisional effectiveness of different actors and therefore the
relative influence of different interests in the governmental
system.3 Furthermore, those who control the technology
might affect how the technology is utilized such as to enhance
their decision-making effectiveness and interests within the
organization.4 That is, computing is likely to entail certain
power payoffs or &dquo;power shifts.&dquo; These power shifts are
&dquo;gains in one person’s decision-making effectiveness made
at the expense of another person’s. They are redistributions
of the benefits of decision making &dquo; (Downs, 1967: 205).
Among the most prominent expectations about the interest
served by computing are the bureaucratic, technocratic,
old-style, and pluralistic hypotheses.
BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS
A prevailing hypothesis is that computing is a tool of the
administrative reform movement, is controlled by the profes-
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sional bureaucrats through central administrative structures,
and is used to improve their ability to manage subordinates
and marshal information which supports their recommenda-
tions to top elected officials (Dutton and Kraemer, 1977;
Ghere, 1978; Laudon, 1974; Downs, 1967). Computing serves
the administrative reform movement by strengthening the role
of the benefits of decision making&dquo; (Downs, 1967: 205).
lower level staff within the organization, and the general
public. In local governments, the bureaucratic politics hy-
pothesis suggests that computing tends to shift power to top
managers (e.g., to the city manager in council-manager cities
and to one or two department heads who informally serve
the top management function in strong-mayor cities).5
TECHNOCRATIC POLITICS
Another common expectation is that computing, like most
high technology, will be controlled by technical people
(Danziger, 1977; Bell, 1973; Downs, 1967; Ellul, 1964).6
Experts with specialized skills in the use of computing-
technocrats-will control the design, development, and
use of the technology for only they understand its operation,
potential, and limits. Thus, computing will tend to serve
their interests in the maintenance and enhancement of the
technocrat’s role in organizational decisions. In local govern-
ments, the technocratic politics hypothesis suggests that
computing tends to shift more power to the &dquo;new urban
planners,&dquo; the modern counterpart of Taylor’s &dquo;new class
of urban managers&dquo; trained in the techniques of scientific
management. In contrast to the traditional planner skilled
in zoning and land use planning, the new urban planner is
skilled in the use of computer-based analytical tools such
as statistical analysis, urban modeling, and simulation. Often
such planners are located in the research division of local
planning departments, but they are also found in urban
renewal, community development, and community analysis
agencies.
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OLD-STYLE POLITICS
Another expectation is that computing is a political tech-
nology which is largely controlled by and serves the elected
officials through improving their capabilities to use and
control information (Chartrand, 1967; Pool et al., 1964).
In local governments, the old-style politics hypothesis suggests
that computing tends to shift more power to the elected mayor
and council who control computing through their legitimate
and formal control over the organization. At the broadest
level, public officials want to be reelected or advance to higher
office and, therefore, might seek to use computing to advance
these political ambitions. Depending on the official’s election
strategy, control over a government’s computer-based in-
formation systems might be used to build public support
indirectly, through improving the quality of governmental
services, monitoring the bureaucracy, and cutting costs.
Or, the politician might seek to use computing to build public
support directly, through its use as a campaign tool for direct
mailings, analysis of voting patterns, or data support justifying
the official’s decision to the public.
PLURALISTIC POLITICS
A prominent rival hypothesis is that no single interest
controls computer technology. Rather, a pluralistic array
of interests-bureaucrats, technicians, and politicians-
participates in the variety of governmental decisions which
shape the adoption and use of computing (Pettigrew, 1975,
1973; Cyert and March, 1963). While a technological elite
might tend to dominate many individual computing decisions,
their influence is mediated by the numerous groups and
interests which place demands on computing service providers
and is further constrained by the bureaucratic politics of
the government which sets the decision rules for the individual
choices. In local governments, the pluralistic politics hypoth-
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esis suggests that computing will benefit elected officials,
managers, and planners who all influence computing decisions.
REINFORCEMENT POLITICS
A final expectation is that control over computing will
vary across organizations. Those who control the technology
will shape it to serve their interests. However because control
over computer technology varies across organizations,
computing does not systematically shift power to a particular
kind of official. That is, computer-based systems tend to
follow and reinforce the existing pattern of power relation-
ships, whether that pattern be pluralistic or centralized in
bureaucrats, technocrats, or politicians. Computing tends
to be used or not used to the degree that it supports the position
or interests of those who control the governmental organiza-
tion. Computing reallocates power or influence only in the
sense that it accentuates existing inequalities of influence.
Computing seldom shifts power away from those who control
governmental decision making (Hoffman, 1977, 1975, 1973).
While the traditional hypotheses emphasize the impact of
a technology on the organization which adopts it, the re-
inforcement hypothesis emphasizes the impact of an organiza-
tion on the technology which it adopts.7 The interests served
by computing are likely to be the same interests served by the
organization which has adopted the technology because
computing simply enhances and extends the organization’s
capability of serving the interests of those who control the
organization. In local governments, this hypothesis suggests
that computing will increase the decision-making effective-
ness of managers in reform governments, mayors in strong-
mayor governments, and departments and planners in govern-
ments with departmental autonomy.
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METHODS AND DATA
Our strategy for empirically assessing the power shift
hypothesis is to focus on those kinds of computer-based
information systems which are most likely to affect the power
relationships among organizational elites within a specific
class of organizations-American cities.
While nearly any use of computer-based information can be
viewed as increasing the decisional effectiveness of some
official or agency in the government,8 those systems which
are most likely to affect the balance of power among bureau-
crats, technicians, and politicans are those which better
enable any of these officials to:
(1) manage-control near term events by getting rapid and
correct feedback about ongoing operations
(2) plan-anticipate future uncontrollable events by getting
analyses of current trends and predictions of future events
(3) persuade or coerce-control decision situations by getting
superior or sensitive information which is perceived as
compelling.
Systems which serve these purposes can be distinguished
by whether they are primarily oriented toward data about the
urban environment or about the internal operations of the
government. Table 1 arrays various illustrative systems
which are likely to affect the decisional effectiveness of bureau-
crats, technicians, and politicians by purpose (management,
planning, and politics) and by the kind of data which supports
their use (data banks versus operational systems).
Data banks pool facts about people and their environment
(e.g., a jurisdiction’s demography and its economy). In turn,
this new information is aggregated and analyzed to determine
environmental conditions (e.g., social indicators of the welfare
of citizens and the health of the economy). These analyses
can be used as a guide to public officials in identifying prob-
lems, determining needs, developing programmatic remedies,
and applying for outside assistance. In some instances, in-
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TABLE 1
A Typology of Computer-Based Urban Data Systems,
Likely to Affect the Decisional Effectiveness of
Bureaucrats, Technicians, and Politicians
formation also is being fed into simulation and other models
which mimic the behavior of some aspect of the environment
(e.g., population growth and economic development). These
analyses and models can be used to pretest the effects of
various public actions as a guide to public officials in deciding
among alternative policies. And, information about people
(their demographic characteristics, likes and dislikes, and
such) can be used to assess the political feasibility of develop-
ment and financial plans.9 As these examples illustrate, such
data banks serve management, planning, and political pur-
poses.
Operational systems are the functionally oriented computer
systems which serve the internal operations of the government
and which contain data about government employees and
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departmental operations. This information is variously
aggregated and analyzed to determine revenue and expenditure
patterns, personnel vacancies, turnover, vacations or sick
leave, individual and departmental workloads, and selected
indicators of performance. These analyses can be used by
public officials in monitoring expenditures, identifying
personnel problems, determining work assignments, and
scheduling or rearranging departmental operations to improve
performance. Sometimes information is fed into computer
models which imitates some operation of a department such
as handling emergency calls, dispatching vehicles, assigning
personnel, or predicting cash flow. These analyses and models
can be used to predict the effects of various departmental
actions as a guide to public officials in deciding among al-
ternative operational priorities and procedures. Also, indi-
vidual and aggregated data from the operational systems
can be used in support of particular policy positions, personnel
actions, collective bargaining negotiations, or citizen requests
and complaints. Consequently, operational data systems can
serve management, planning, and political purposes similar
to their data bank counterparts.
Given the different types of computer-based information
systems in government and the different purposes they serve,
our research strategy is first to empirically describe the use
of data banks and operational systems by each type of decision
maker for management, planning, and political purposes.
This enables us to address the patterns of computer utilization
characteristic of bureaucrats (city managers and adminis-
trators), technicians (new urban planners), and politicians
(elected mayors and councils). These patterns of computer
utilization allow us to speculate about the likely magnitude
and direction of power shifts, for the use of computing seems
to be a necessary if not sufficient condition for power shifts
to occur. Second, we more directly explore the magnitude
and direction of power shifts through an analysis of system-
atically coded case study observations regarding those officials
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whose influence was affected by the use of computing in 42
cities.
THE SAMPLE
This study is based on data collected in 1976 in 42 U.S.
cities over 50,000 in population. The cities were selected
by a stratified sampling procedure such that all cities were
automated and that the cities vary in the sophistication,
extensiveness, and organizational arrangements of com-
puting. « Thus, the average sample city is somewhat more
automated than the typical U. S. city over 50,000; and the
computing environments of these cities have somewhat more
variation than would be the case for a random sample of
automated cities.
THE DATA
Within each city, data were collected using self-administered
questionnaires, field-coded questionnaires, and case studies
of the use of computing by top managers, mayors, councils,
and planners. A pretested self-administered questionnaire was
completed by the manager and several of the manager’s staff,
the mayor and several staff, a sample of council and staff,
and those people responsible for maintaining and analyzing
computer-based urban data banks and operational data-the
planners and analysts.&dquo; I
In addition to the self-administered questionnaires, the
field work involved six investigators, including the authors,
in case studies of each city for an average of three person-
weeks in each of at least eight cities. Each site visit provided
rich case study material as well as systematic judgmental
ratings based on these case studies. This was accomplished
by a series of structured questionnaires which were completed
by the investigators during each site visit based on their case
work, interviews, and archival research on each site. These
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questionnaires recorded their observations by a series of
predetermined questions and response categories. This paper
relies most heavily on these field-coded instruments as em-
pirical data on the way in which computing is used by local
government officials.
LIMITATIONS
There are several important limitations to our analysis.
First, this study is based on a limited group of U.S. cities,
namely those with at least a moderate level of automation.
Second, the concept of power shifts is controversial and
its measurement is complex. Our study accepts a single defini-
tion of power shifts and is limited to systematic field observa-
tions and interviews at one point in time to explore a phe-
nomenon which occurs over time. But, because power shifts
raise important issues for the evaluation of technological
reform, we have attempted to assess power shifts from com-
puting by systematically integrating survey and case study
methodology. We hope that other researchers will investigate
similar issues in other settings and with other approaches
and operational measures of power shifts. Third, this research
does not deal with the interorganizational interests which
may be served by computing. This study is focused on the
intraorganizational, bureaucratic politics of computing
and is only suggestive of the impact of computing on the
relative influence of local governments vis-a-vis either the
general public or other organizations.
FINDINGS
DO POWER SHIFTS OCCUR?
The frequency and magnitude of power shifts are likely
to depend on the degree and kind of use made of computers
by bureaucrats, technocrats, and politicians. In order to
describe the use of urban data banks and operational systems,
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we inquired about whether or not each kind of public official
used either data banks, in each of six tasks displayed in Table
2, or operational systems, in each of four tasks displayed
in Table 3. We then asked for examples and evidence of
this use. The responses were used to categorize each official
by whether computing was not used, used only in exceptional
cases, or generally used (not just in isolated or nonspecific
cases) for each task.
Use of Data Banks
The patterns of data bank use suggest that power shifts
are likely to occur but the magnitude of power shifts is likely
to be less than predicted in much of the literature (Table 2).
First, while each kind of official tends to use data banks, the
overall use of data banks is low. In only about 10% of the
cities does any given kind of public official generally use
data banks. In about half the cities, the officials use data
banks only in exceptional cases. For only two tasks, problem
finding and problem legitimation, does any kind of official
tend to generally use data banks in over 10% of the cities.
Second, there are more similarities than differences in
use by role.12 Planners are the major users of data banks
given that their median level of use is highest on five of the
six tasks. The planners are followed by the managers, mayors,
and council, respectively. But, the total difference among
roles on any task is less than 20% and most frequently is about
10%. This small difference in use among officials is unexpected
given the predictions in much of the power shift literature.
Third, each kind of official tends to use data banks in
somewhat different ways. Other data indicate that planners
focus on planning and political purposes. 13 Table 2 further
indicates that while managers are more likely to use data
banks for planning purposes (problem finding, decision
making, and policy development), they are about as likely as
are the elected officials to use data banks for political purposes
92 ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIETY / MAY 1979
TABLE 2
Levels of Use of Urban Data Banks by Type of Official
a Percentage of cities where one or more data banks are automated, but not used in this
way by role type
b Scored 1 = not used, 2 = exceptional use, 3 = generally used
(legitimizing their position, gaining publicity, and determining
the political feasibility of different actions). Thus, while
there is some specialization among roles in the purposes
for which they use computing, no kind of official seems to
have a monopoly over the use of computing in a specific area.
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Use of Operational Systems
The relatively low use of urban data banks by public officials
might be due to the fact that data banks play a minor role
in urban decision making when compared to operational
data systems. Operational data systems are used more ex-
tensively than urban data banks, but overall use remains
moderate (Table 3). In more than three-fourths of the cities,
operational systems are used for management, planning, and
political purposes. Also, there are somewhat greater dif-
ferences in use by role. The managers’ use of operational
systems clearly dominates when compared to the use made by
elected officials. In about one-half of the cities, the managers
make general use of operational data systems for monitoring
subunits, making decisions, and documenting policy positions.
The only use which ranks low for the managers is responding
to citizen complaints. In contrast, mayors most often use
operational data for documenting policy positions and
monitoring subunits. Thus, our general implication remains
the same. Power shifts are quite possible, but not dramatic
in their intensity.
WHO GAINS AND LOSES?
The direction of power shifts is also likely to be sensitive
to the degree and kind of use made of computers by bureau-
crats, technocrats, and politicians. The relative frequency
with which each kind of official tends to use computing
implies a loose hierarchy of officials who are more likely
to gain in decision-making effectiveness (Tables 2 and 3).
Planners tend to dominate the use of data banks; managers
tend to dominate the use of operational data systems. This
suggests that managers and planners generally gain somewhat
more decision-making effectiveness than elected mayors or
councils. However, the often small differences among officials
in their frequency of use is suggestive of patterns expected
by the pluralist interpretation.
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TABLE 3
Levels of Use of Operational Data Systems by
Type of Official
a. Percentage of cities where operational data is automated, but not used by role type
b. Scored 1 = not used in this way, 2 = exceptional use, 3 = general use.
Patterns of Use
This loose hierarchy of officials with relatively greater
and lesser gain from computing is based upon the percentage
of cities in which a particular official rated high or low in
the use of computing. It might be that in cities where the
manager gains, the mayor and council does not, and vice
versa. In other words, the data could still support extensive
power shifts if we find a tendency for high levels of use by
one subset of officials. But, as shown in Table 4, this is not
a pattern of data bank or operational system utilization.
Cities where one kind of official tends to have a high level
of use, either of data banks or operational systems, are cities
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TABLE 4
Relationships Among Indicators of the Use of
Computer-Based Operational and Data Bank Information
by Role Types
a Pearson correlations among role types for use of operational data is presented in upper
right and correlations for use of data banks is presented in lower left
b p < 05
where all other kinds of officials will tend to have a high
level of use. Rather than cities being distinguished by different
kinds of officials dominating the use of computing, cities are
largely distinguished by those with and those without a high
use of computing by planners, bureaucrats, and politicians.
Thus, the simple frequencies presented above do not mask
more differentiated patterns of utilization. This finding
tends to cast further doubt on the bureaucratic, technocratic,
and old-style politics hypotheses and tends to add support
to the pluralistic hypothesis.
The Frequency of Power Shifts
While the frequency of utilization is suggestive of power
shifts, a more direct measurement is available in the form of
judgmental ratings made on the basis of extensive case study
observations within each site. Table 5 shows the degree
to which each type of public official was judged to gain and
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lose influence as a result of computing in local government.
These ratings further support the existence of power shifts
and the same loose hierarchy of gainers described above.
Computing is judged to have had some effect on the relative
influence of at least one official in about 80% of the cities.
Where there is an effect, computing has tended to increase
rather than decrease the influence of public officials. While
computing has decreased the influence of at least some officials
in 27% of the cities, it has increased the influence of some
officials in 54% of the cities. By rank, those who tend to gain
(and not lose) influence are the planners (the technicians),
the top managers and department heads (the bureaucrats), and
the mayor and council (the politicians).
However, these rankings are less pronounced than either
the technocratic or bureaucratic formulation of the power shift
hypothesis suggests. Planners are not great beneficiaries of
computing for they tend to gain influence in only about 27%
of the cities. Likewise, managers have gained influence in only
about 27% of the cities, while department heads and mayors
gained influence in nearly as many, 18% and 19% respectively.
Only the councils generally tend to have lost influence (in
20% of the cities) as a result of computing more often than
they have gained influence (in 5% of the cities). Thus, no
single official appears to be a general, substantial, and sole
beneficiary of power shifts from computing in cities. The
shifts that occur are mainly gains rather than losses in the
influence of officials, and the gains appear to be shared among
nearly all officials. These findings, therefore, add support
to the pluralist interpretation.
Patterns of Power Shifts
While the marginals reported in Table 5 are supportive
of the pluralist hypothesis, they are susceptible to a common
problem with the aggregation of cross-sectional data. The
same marginals could result from pluralistic patterns charac-
terizing some subset of cities or the operation of different
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TABLE 5
Percentage of Cities Where the Use of Computer-Based
Data Shifted Influence Among Officials
a. Based on interviews at one-point-in-time, investigators developed a case history of
the use of computing and its impacts on power shifts in each city Each kind of official
in each city was then scored as having had their influence decreased, unaffected, or
increased as a result of computing. Disagreements between investigators (normally
two per city) were resolved by reexamining the case histories
models of power shifts in different cities. Thus, it is important
to evaluate the pluralist interpretation by testing whether
it is the case that power gains on the part of one official are
positively associated with power gains on the part of other
officials-as would be the case for the pluralist model.
Surprisingly, in contrast to patterns of computer utilization,
the patterns of power shifts are opposite the expectations
of the pluralist hypothesis (Table 6). Power gains of one
official are not positively associated with gains of other
officials. Instead, there is a great deal of independence.
Apparently, different models of power shifts operate in
different cities, rather than pluralistic patterns being charac-
teristic of a subset of cities in which power shifts are relevant.
Power Reinforcement from Computer Use
The reinforcement politics hypothesis provides a plausible
explanation for why the nature of power shifts might vary
98 ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIETY / MAY 1979
TABLE 6
Relationships Among Power Shift Ratings
for Different Officials
a Pearson correlations are presented m upper right and sample sizes are presented
m the lower left
across cities. It may be that computing tends to reinforce
the influence of those officials in control rather than to shift
influence to a particular type of official. Because the influence
structures of local governments vary, so might the nature of
power shifts. In order to test the reinforcement hypothesis,
we next explore the relationship between the structure of
influence within a city and power shifts. If the reinforcement
hypothesis is valid, then those in control should gain and
certainly not lose power as a result of computing.
Table 7 describes the relationship between power shifts
and several independent variables that tend to reflect the
influence structures of local governments. Generally, power
shifts tend to accentuate the existing structure of influence
within the city, thereby supporting the reinforcement hy-
pothesis (Table 7). In strong-mayor cities, computing tends
to shift greater influence to the mayor, while in council man-
ager cities, computing tends to shift greater influence to the
manager. In larger cities with more complex and decentralized
influence structures, computing tends to shift power away
from the top manager and toward the planners and the operat-
ing departments, which already are likely to enjoy more
autonomy than their counterparts in smaller cities. And where
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TABLE 7
Pearson Correlations Between Selected Independent
Variables and Power Shifts to Managers, Mayors,
Councils, Planner Analysts and Departments
a Marginals for these dependent variables are presented m Table 5
b Two or more informants in each city were asked &dquo;Consider a decision related to data
processing, such as mtroducmg computers to help perform a task How often has each
of the following officials had a major mput mto the final decision?&dquo;
mayors and councils are influential in computing decisions,
managers are less likely to gain power as a result of computing.
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Given the diversity of opinion regarding both the existence
and direction of power shifts, we have examined the use of
urban data banks and operational data systems as well as
the power shifts to which they can be linked. From this exam-
ination, we can review the findings concerning the magnitude
of power shifts and draw some conclusions as to the ex-
planatory power of the five hypotheses regarding the direction
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of power shifts. We will then turn to the interests which are
likely to be served as a result of these power shifts.
Power shifts occur in most automated local governments
but these shifts tend to be subtle, limited, and complex in
their patterns. While power shifts were judged to occur in
over 75% of the cities investigated, the generally low to
moderate use of computing for management, planning, or
politics tends to limit the relevance of computing to the power
relationships among bureaucrats, technocrats, and politicians.
Across all governments, the relative decision-making effective-
ness of no single kind of official is overwhelmingly enhanced
by computer use.
The bureaucratic politics hypothesis suggests that managers
will be major beneficiaries of power shifts. We did find that
managers are the most frequent users of operational data
systems and that managers were judged to have gained some
influence in about one-fourth of the cities. However, managers
are not the most frequent users of data banks and are not the
most frequent beneficiary of power shifts. While managers are
somewhat more likely to gain as a result of computing in the
smaller city manager cities, they are not the dominant benefi-
ciary in general. Consequently, the bureaucratic politics
hypothesis is not descriptive of our findings.
The technocratic politics hypothesis suggests that the
new urban planners will be the major beneficiaries of power
shifts. We did find that planners both use data banks more
than other officials for nearly every use investigated and
are the most likely beneficiaries of power shifts. However,
they have far from a monopoly over the use of data banks,
are nearly irrelevant to the use of operational systems, and
tend to gain influence in only about a third of the cities in-
vestigated. Furthermore, where planners tend to gain, so do
mayors and other operating departments, generally in the
larger cities. Thus, while the technocratic politics hypothesis
predicts the relative dominance of the planners, it fails to
explain the overall pattern of power shifts which include
many shifts in favor of other officials.
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The old-style politics hypothesis suggests that elected
officials will be the major beneficiaries of power shifts. This
is not supported. While mayors and councils use computing
and sometimes appear to gain influence as a consequence,
they least often gain and most often lose influence relative
to planners and bureaucrats.
The pluralist hypothesis suggests that no single kind of
official predominantly gains in decision-making effectiveness.
This hypothesis finds substantial support in that each kind
of official uses computer-based data and all appear to occa-
sionally gain influence as a result. Further support is provided
by the fact that where one kind of official tends to use com-
puter-based data, so do the other kinds of officials. However,
the patterns of power shifts are inconsistent with the pluralist
hypothesis and suggest the operation of different power
shifts in different cities.
Finally, the reinforcement politics hypothesis suggests
that computer-based systems tend to follow and reinforce
the existing pattern of power relationships. This hypothesis
is most consistent with all survey findings and explains
why we find the nature of power shifts to vary across govern-
ments. Each model of power shifts-the bureaucratic, techno-
cratic, old-style, and pluralist-might be found to operate
in some cities, depending on the existing structure of influence.
Thus, planners and managers tend to be relative gainers
because of the existing structure of influence in local govern-
ments. In many cities the planning function is taking on a
greater role with the increased importance of federal grants,
needs assessment, evaluation components of programs, and
more stringent reporting requirements. In the large cities,
these factors come to play within an organizational setting
which is more decentralized. Within such a system, planners
have some autonomy and gain relatively more influence than
they might otherwise have without the computing resource.
Likewise, managers clearly gain in influence in relation to
their subordinates by the use of computing to monitor and
control departmental operations. Yet, computing does not
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tend to shift greater influence to the manager in those cities
where departments and agencies have a great deal of political
autonomy from the manager-that is, in the large, strong-
mayor cities. In contrast, computing tends to reinforce the
power of the manager in the smaller city manager cities in
which the mayor and council are less active and influential.
WHOSE INTERESTS ARE SERVED?
The local government reform movement sought to make
local government more efficient and rational through a series
of structural and technological reforms. However, computing
as an administrative reform has not had a large role in increas-
ing the influence of professional managers in the operation
of local government. Rather, those who control local govern-
ment decisions have adapted this technology to serve the
existing social and political structures. Thus, computing is
a malleable technology. It can be shaped to serve the interests
of administrative reform to the degree that administrative
reformers control the operations of local government. Where
they do not, computing is likely to serve other interests.
Computing can be viewed as a malleable but certainly
not an apolitical technology to the degree that it serves those
interests which control its design and use. It is a means, a tool,
for accomplishing the ends of those who use it. However,
its impacts are not neutral. Given the current patterns of
control over computing and use of the technology, computing
as now implemented tends to serve some interests more than
others. Most generally, computing supports the status quo of
most local governments. 14 Specifically, urban data systems
have been shaped to serve the interests of the planners, top
managers, and department managers over elected officials.
In large part, this bias of computing is a reflection of the
success of the structural reform of local government. It may
be that reformers have been successful in raising the influence
of technocrats and bureaucrats in the operations of local
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government to the point that they can shape organizational
change and innovation to further enhance their influence.
NOTES
1. Danziger and Dutton (1977) indicate that reform structures promote techno-
logical innovations, such as computing, in local governments.
2. The federal government was first and has remained the most extensively
automated level of American government. However, computing has broadly pene-
trated both state and local governments. A 1976 survey of 49 states shows that they
are directly served by at least 603 separate computer systems (NASIS, 1977). At
the local level, more than 90% of the cities over 50,000 population and counties over
100,000 population now utilize computers in their operations (Matthews et al., 1976;
Kraemer, Dutton, and Matthews, 1975).
3. The power shift hypothesis has attained credibility by virtue of multiple
predictions (Kraemer and King, 1976; Crecine and Brunner, 1972; Oettinger, 1971;
Etzioni, 1970; Whisler, 1970a, 1970b; Downs, 1967; Leavitt and Whisler, 1958) and
empirical research (Dutton and Kraemer, 1977; Hoffman, 1977, 1975, 1973; Laudon,
1974).
4. Who controls technology within public organizations has been shown to
affect the adoption, development, and orientation of the technology (Danziger and
Dutton, 1977; Dutton and Kraemer, 1977).
5. In most strong-mayor cities these officials tend to be the Director of Finance
or the Director of Management and Budget. These officials tend to have professional
management backgrounds and tend to be given the chief administrative roles of
the mayor. These officials should be distinguished from another group of department
heads whose management role is much more limited and from the mayor’s political
advisers who often fill one or two department head positions but serve little or no
management role.
6. While both Danziger (1977) and Downs (1967) broadly suggest that technically
educated officials are more likely to control high technology, they do not specifically
deal with the planner analysts on whom we focus.
7. Studies of computing in organizations by Dutton and Kraemer (1977).
Hoffman (1977, 1975, 1973), and Laudon (1974) point out the overriding influence
of an organization on how a technology is used.
8. The use of computing to send utility bills has no obvious power implications
for relations among managers, planners, and elected officials. However, it has very
problematic and subtle implications for the relative control relationships between
government and the general public.
9. Surveys of public preference have been used for determining which projects
would be supportable through bond elections.
10. This sampling procedure is described in detail in Kraemer, Danziger, Dutton,
Mood, and Kling (1975). 
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11. In mayor-council cities there was often an official who served the role of
manager such as the Director of Management and Budget. Also, many cities have
no mayors or council staffs.
12. The self reports point even more clearly than the researcher’s ratings to the
greater similarities than differences in the use of computing by public officials. The
mean level of computer use for planning purposes was 42, 44, 41, and 52 for managers,
mayors, council, and planners, respectively. Planning uses included the identification
of city problems, the identification of solutions to city problems, and the identification
of changing city conditions. The mean level of computer use for management purposes
was 46, 44, 39, and 30 for managers, mayors, council, and planners, respectively.
Management uses included budget making, daily expenditure decisions, salary
negotiations, determining the real costs of programs, controlling staff, setting realistic
goals for subordinates, allocating manpower, monitoring subordinates and de-
termining the efficiency of operating units.
13. These data are based upon open-ended responses in which public officials
mentioned the use of data banks in ways conforming to our categories of adminis-
trative reporting, planning analysis, and political uses. Planners mentioned adminis-
trative uses in 90% of the cities, planning uses in 90%, and political uses in 22%.
Managers mentioned administrative uses in 63%, planning uses in 47%, and political
uses in 23%. Elected officials mentioned administrative uses in 40%, planning uses
in 54%, and political uses in 47%.
14. The nature of our sample and observations limits the generality of our findings
to American cities. However, the consistency between the findings of other studies and
the reinforcement politics hypothesis adds credibility to this hypothesis as a descrip-
tion of the nature of power shifts beyond the local government level (Dutton and
Kraemer, 1978; Hoffman, 1977; Laudon, 1974; Westin, 1972a, 1972b).
For example, Westin’s (1972a, 1972b) case studies of computing in federal, state,
and local agencies indicate that "computers have been a factor in consolidating rather
than in redistributing governmental power" (1972b: 21). Westin also concludes
that there is not "the slightest sign of a displacement of the traditional elites of top
and middle management in government by information specialists" (1972b: 21).
This is supported by Hoffman’s (1977) study of computing in the Soviet Union which
examines the classic case for those who forecast the rise of a technocratic elite with
the emergence of modern information processing technologies. Hoffman concludes
that:
native and imported information technology is not likely to alter the fundamen-
tal characteristics of the Soviet political system and the central values of the
national Communist party leaders. Rather, computerized information systems
are among the important new means to pursue traditional values and goals
[1977: 429].
Also, a comparison of computer-based information systems in the United States
and Western Europe illustrates how computing tends to reinforce existing structures.
Computer-based systems serving local governments in the United States are relatively
fragmented and decentralized whereas those in Germany and Scandinavia are rela-
tively integrated and centralized, each reflecting their political and cultural setting
(Kenneth and Maestre, 1974; Lenk, 1973).
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